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For some time it was generally understood that anything goes with con-
jectural variations in oligopoly theory. Depending on the conjecturea of each
participant regarding the behaviour of the other participants, the whole range
of outputa between monopoly and competition were possible outcomes ( eee Eugene
Fama and Arthur Laffer). Econometric etudies were performed to empirically
estimate conjectural variations and the degree of oligopoly power for specific
industries (e.g. Elie Appelbaum). Recently, the idea of a consiatent conjectu-
ral variations equilibrium (CCVE) was introduced to decide on the value of the
conjectural variation on theoretical grounds by Timothy Bresnahan, Martin Per-
ry, Morton Kamien and Nancy Schwartz, and Charles Holt. Consistency implied
that the conjectural variation had to match the derivative of the reaction
function, which it was claimed yielded a unique value for the conjectural va-
riation. This paper argues that this type of conaistency is not very relevant
and that a weaker type of consistency, leading to the consiatent conjecturea
equilibrium (CCE), is more appropriate. The concept of reaction function is2
intrinsicly linked to the Cournot~Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium concepte,
but not to the consietent conjectural variatíons equilibrium or coneistent
conjectures equilibrium. The reaction function associated with the Stackelberg
equilibrium describes the reaction of the follower to the action of the leader
which is part of the follower's information set. In the Cournot~Nash concept
the reaction functions describe the reactions of each individual player to the
actions of the other players for the hypothetical caee these actions are
known. The equilibrium concept requires consistency of theae hypothetical re-
action functions. Nummerical procedures to find the Cournot~Nash equilibrium
can be conaidered as reactions to and fro in notional time. The crucial point
is that in the conjectural variations concept there are no reactions func-
tional This implies that it is not posaible to compare conjectural variations
and derivatives of reaction functions. Consistency can only be required for
conjecturea, on the one hand, and resulting actiona, on the other hand, which
leads to our consistent conjectures equilibrium. The conclusion will be that
still anything ie possible even with consistent conjectures. Section I elabo-
rates on the concepts of conjectures and reactions. Section ZI analyaes a duo-
poly example and Section III concludea the paper.
I. Conjecturea and Reactions
This aection attempts to put the concepts conjectures and reactions in
perspective. For the sake of simplicity only two players (firms) are conside-
red. These players choose actiona u and v to maximise II1(u,v) and II2(u,v),
respectively. It is assumed that the first and second derivativea of II1 and
II2 exist and are continuous and that
nluu' nluv' n2w ' n2vu ~ 0'3
(i) Stackelberg equilibrium
If player 1 is the leader and player 2 is the follower, the optimal
actione of the follower follow from II2v(u,v) ~ 0. The implicit function theo-
rem yields the reaction function v a g(u), so that the action u must be known
to player 2. The Stackelberg equilibrium ís given by
uS a arguax II1(u,g(u)) and vS a g(uS).
(11) Cournot~Nash equilibrium
The first order conditiona IIlu(u,v) ~ 0 and II2v(u,v) ~ 0 yield the
hypothetical reactions functions u s f(v), f'
s-nluv'qluu ~ 0 and v~ g(u),
g~ a-~2vu,~2vv ~ 0. The Cournot~Nash equilibrium corresponds to the fixed
points of uN z f(g(uN)) and vN ~ g(f(vN)). The functions f(.) and g(.) cannot
really be interpreted as reaction functions until some dynamic adjustment pro-






Rluv ~2vu ~ Fluu F2vv
and the steady-state corresponds to the
Cournot~Nash equilibrium. Note that the reaction functions depend on obser-
vable actions.4
(111) Conjectures
Suppose that player 1 conjecturea a hypothetical (differentiable) re-
action function v- y~(u) and player 2 a hypothetical (differentiable) reaction
function u a~(v) with conjectural variations ~'(.) and ~'(.), respectively.
The first order conditions correspond to a system of partial differential
equations,
(2)
nlu (u.v~(u)) i- nlv (u~v~(u)) v~'(u) - 0
n2v (~(v),~) } n2u (~(~),~) ~'(v) - o
which yields optimal actions u~ and v~, given the conjectures ~(.) and
~(.). A consistent conjectures equilibrium (CCE) consists of functions
~ ~
~(.) and ~(.), with resulting actions u and v, such that
~ ~ ~ ~
(3) u s~(v ) and v s,y(u ).
The authors who introduced the concept of consistent conjectural variations
equilibrium (CCVE) start from constant conjectural variations, say rl ~~'(u)
and r2 ~~'(v). They use a rather odd version of (2),
IIlu (u,v) f IIlv (u,v) rl ~ 0
li2v (u,v) f n2u (u.v) r2 ~ 0~
ín order to produce "reaction functions", u m f(v,rl) and v~ g(u,r2), whose
derivativea, fv(v,rl) and gu(u,r2), can be equated with the conjectural varia-5
tions, r2 and r1. This procedure yields the consistent conjectural varia-
tions, r1 and r2, and the corresponding actiona, u~~ and v~~. Obviously, such
a CCVE is a CCE but not necessarily vice versa(1). However, either reaction
functions are derived from fírst order conditions as in the Stackelberg and
Cournot~Nash concepts or they are conjectured. A mixture of these as is done
in the CCVE literature lacka a sound game-theoretic interpretation. For ex-
ample, it is impossible to attach an associated dynamic in notional time (cf.
(1)) as conjectural variations, in contrast to actions, are not observable.
lí. Duopoly Model
The discussion of Section 2 is illuatrated with the analysis of a
simple duopoly model with constant marginal costa, linear demand and perfect
substitution. The profit functions are
II1(u,v) ~ (A - B(ufv))u
(4)
II2(u,v) ~ (A - B(ufv))v.
The Stackelberg equilibrium gives uS -.A~2B, vS ~ A~4B, IIi - A2~8B and
IiZ a A2~16B. The Cournot~Nash equilibrium is always stable under the iterative
scheme (1) and gives uN a vN ~ A~3B and IIi a II? ~ A2~9B. The conjecturea
~y(.) and ~(.) lead to the first order conditions
(1) In our view, the concept of CCE is more closely related to Bowley's cou-
cept of conjectures than the CCVE.6
A- B(u t ~,(u)) - Bu(1 -F. ~y'(u)) s 0
A- B(~(v) f v) - Bv(1 t~'(v)) ~ 0.
It is easily verified that the conjectures
,~(u)a(AlB)-u-(CIu)
(6)
~(~) - (AIB) - v - (Dl~),
satisfy (5), so that all admissable u and v are maximum locations. That is to
say, profits are constant and equal to BC and BD for firms 1 and 2, respectí-
vely. A CCE requires (3), which combined with symmetry yields C~ D and(1)
(7) u~ a v~- (A f A2 - SBZC) I 4B.
For real solutions C t A2~8B2 has to be satisfied, which means that profits,
BC, cannot exceed the profits obtained under collusion (or by the Stackelberg
leader). Clearly, many CCE's are feasible apart from the zero-profit CCVE
(Bertrand equilibrium) characterized by linear conjectures and constant coit-
jectural variations (C - D a 0), which is advocated in the literature (see,
for example, Tímothy Bresnahan). Note that the Cournot~Nash equilibrium (or
collusive outcome) can be sustained as a CCE, but not as a CCVE, with nonli-
near conjectures (6) and C~ D- A2~9B2 (or A2~8B2).
2
(1) A CCE must satisfy the quadratic equation 2 u~` -(A~B) u~ t C~ 0 of
which ( 7) ís one solution. The other solution yields u~ ~ Aí4B, which is itr-
admissable.7
The linear conjectures
(8) ~y(u) a au f b and ~(v) 0 cv t d
yield, upon substitution in (2), the optimal actions
~ B- b ~ A~B-d
(9) u' 2(lta)
and v' 2(lfc) '
Symmetry and consistency of conjectures, (3), yield a a c a(A~B - 3d) ~
(A~B f d) and b L d, so that u~ 3 v~` ~(A~B t d)~4 with individual profits gí-
ven by (A2~B2 - d2)B~B.(1) The value b~ d~ 0(and a s c~ 1) corresponda to
a CCE with conjectures "my rival mimicks what I do" and leads to tacit collu-
sion. The Cournot~Nash equilibrium can be sustained as a trivial CCE, that is
(8) with b~ d~ A~3B ( and a a c~ 0). Finally, the zero-profit ( Bertrand)
equilibrium of courae occurs for b v d- A~B (and a~ c~-1).
III. Conclusíona
The concept of conaistent conjectural variationa equilibrium (CCVE) has
been rejected in favour of the weaker conaiatent conjecturea equilibrium
(CCE). The main reason for this is that the CCVE starts from conetant conjec-
tural variations and aubsequently derives "reaction functions", which depend
on unobservable conjectures. Since one cannot attach a dynamic in notional
time, it is not clear why and how the CCVE can be reached until these informa-
tional problems have been reaolved. In genezal, it is possible to think of
(1) Note that many other aymmetric conjectures, say ~y ( u) e au t b,
a x(A~B-3b)~(A~B f b), exiat which are not coneiatent.s
CCE's, if necessary using nonlinear conjectures, that yield the whole range
from competitive to collusíve outcomes (including the Cournot~Nash outcome).
Timothy Bresnahan's result that the zero-profit (Bertrand) equilibrium is the
uni ue oligopoly outcome ehould therefore be treated with suspicion and cannot
be regarded as more satisfactory then any other of the CCE's. Recent applica-
tions of dynamic game theory in economica (e.g. Andries Brandsma and Andrew
Hughes Hallett) suffer from the same problems.9
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